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Abstract
We model an N-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which players are given traits (e.g., height, age, wealth) which, we
assume, affect their behavior. The relationship between traits and behavior is unknown to other players. We then analyze
the performance of ‘‘prejudiced’’ strategies—strategies that draw inferences based on the observation of some or all of
these traits, and extrapolate the inferred behavior to other carriers of these traits. Such prejudiced strategies have the
advantage of learning rapidly, and hence of being well adapted to rapidly changing conditions that might result, for
example, from high migration or birth rates. We find that they perform remarkably well, and even systematically outperform
both Tit-For-Tat and ALLD when the population changes rapidly.
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Introduction
People frequently judge and discriminate each other on the
basis of their skin color, gender, or clothing style. Beyond the
ethical issues they raise, such prejudices seem inefficient. They
often lead to erroneous judgements, missed opportunities and
resentment and, at the aggregate level, to segregation, riots, or
religious conflicts [1]. Why, then, are they so ubiquitous?
In this paper, we argue that prejudices strive because strategies
that rely on them can be very successful in competitive
environments. Prejudices are heuristics based on accumulated
experiences, expressed as simple cognitive relationships between
specific traits (e.g., height) and behavior (e.g., aggressiveness).
These associations, acquired through evolution or experience,
enable people to reach judgments about complex situations or
competitors in a ‘‘blink’’ [2–7]. In this sense, they are closely
related to people’s ability to process large amounts of information
rapidly and often unconsciously, and to reach quick decisions
[8–10].
One explanation for these ‘‘heuristics that make us smart’’ [9] is
evolutionary. When our ancestors interacted with strangers, those
who could rapidly and accurately discriminate between dangerous
and trustworthy partners were more likely to survive and
reproduce. However, this explanation does not inform us about
the conditions under which relying on these cognitive shortcuts is
rational or optimal [11]. The fact that, empirically, people do rely
on rules of thumb certainly implies that these rules can be useful
and efficient, but not that they always are. In fact, even though our
intuitive judgments are often accurate, they also frequently lead to
errors and inaccuracies [12], so that the opposite argument could
be made equally well: evolutionarily, those most likely to survive
are those able to assess situations calmly and to derive rational
conclusions–not hasty responses based on emotions or ‘‘gut-
feelings’’ [13,14].
In summary, we know little about the fitness of strategies that
use only a limited subset of the available information to reach
conclusions about their social partners. Can prejudices–the
extrapolation onto others of the behavior of people characterized
by similar attributes–form the basis of a successful strategy in a
competitive environment? In this paper, we investigate the
performance of these rules of thumb by putting them in
competition with well-known strategies such as Tit-For-Tat or
defection. We derive conditions under which prejudiced strategies
outperform these other strategies and when, on the contrary, they
are suboptimal.
Prejudices have the advantage of providing pre-defined
guidelines for interactions, without the need to learn the other’s
specificities. As such, they enable rapid reactions to unknown
circumstances–for example those involving a significant portion of
interactions with foreigners. We will show that they can
successfully avoid exploitation, while still taking advantage of
cooperation with populations that have been found to be
cooperative. Of course, such learning speed comes at a cost.
Because prejudices are coarse-grained inferences based on a
limited number of attributes, they are particularly prone to error
(e.g., not all green people are uneducated) and hence lead to some
level of exploitation (e.g., wrongly assuming that all blue people
are cooperators) or missed opportunities.
Despite this inaccuracy, we find that strategies based on
prejudices perform well for a large range of parameters. They
are particularly well suited for situations in which the population
renews itself relatively rapidly–for example because of high
migration or birth rates. In these situations, they even outperform
the most successful strategies that have previously been proposed
in the literature [15]: those based on reciprocity (Tit-For-Tat, a
strategy in which a player starts cooperating, and then copies the
interaction partner’s decisions), and those based on exploitation
(ALLD, in which an individual always defects).
Methods
To model prejudices, we assume that individuals are diverse
[16,17]. They are defined by observable attributes (e.g., age,
gender, or wealth) which affect–albeit to different degrees–their
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short and young people might be more likely to cooperate,
whereas green, tall and old ones are more likely to defect. These
relations are unknown to individuals in the beginning. Instead,
players must rely on their experience–previous interactions with
other people exhibiting these traits–in order to extrapolate the
effect of certain traits on behavior–the more traits, the more
difficult inferences are.
The idea that behavior and certain visible traits are correlated
may not always be accurate. Still, we believe that many observable
cues (e.g., age, displays of wealth) can provide at least some
information about people’s capabilities and probable behavior. A
person’s height, for example, appears to be correlated with her
ability and job market performance [18]. We are not arguing here
that observable traits are sufficient to determine behavior, but
rather that there exists a correlation that can be uncovered. We
explore later the impact of watering down that correlation by
adding noise in the mapping from attributes to strategies.
In our model, players draw inferences differently depending on
their level of prejudice. Highly prejudiced individuals focus on
only one attribute (e.g., height), and base their behavior on this
trait alone (e.g., tall people tend to be aggressive, hence I should
defect). Less prejudiced individuals, on the other hand, will be
more nuanced and base their decisions on additional attributes
(e.g., I know that tall, blue and poor people tend to be cooperative,
but I cannot judge on the basis of height alone). In this sense, Tit-
For-Tat–responding in kind to the opponent’s previous actions–is
the most unprejudiced strategy, in that it treats every individual as
unique and does not make any assumption about others, even if
they carry the same traits as those of previously encountered
individuals.
More formally, individuals denoted by i are assigned a ran-
dom vector of N traits (analogous to a ‘‘DNA sequence’’)
~ A Ai:½ai
1,ai
2,...,ai
N , where ai
n[f0,1g is a binary attribute that
can be interpreted as, for example, player i’s color (red/blue),
gender (male/female), or clothing (rich/poor).
Players can have one of three possible strategies: Tit-for-tat
(TFT), whereby the player cooperates in the first round, after
which she copies what her partner did in the previous round;
Always Defect (ALLD), whereby the player always defects,
regardless of the history of play; and Prejudiced, whereby a player
bases its response on the traits of her opponent.
Prejudiced players, denoted by P(n), observe the first n[N of
their interaction partners’ attributes and, on that basis, decide
whether to cooperate. We call those with a small n highly
prejudiced players, and those with a large n little prejudiced
players. For example, a highly prejudiced player, P(1), would
observe only the first attribute (ai
1) of its partners’ DNA sequence
~ A Ai, whereas a less prejudiced one, P(N), would observe all N
traits.
To illustrate the idea, consider a sample population of I~5
individuals with N~4 traits, and how they would be categorized
by prejudiced players (Fig. 1). P(1) only observes and bases its
response strategy on attribute ai
1, and hence forms very coarse
groups (e.g., green vs. blue people). On the contrary, P(4) draws
no inference, since no two individuals share the same sequence of
traits. In other words, it treats each individual as unique in this
example. Clearly, observing more attributes before reaching an
opinion contributes to a finer-grained view of the population,
because it splits it into smaller and smaller subsets. However, it has
the disadvantage of requiring the observation of a larger
population before inferences can be drawn.
Based on these observations, P(n) forms beliefs b about specific
sequences of traits. A belief is a mapping b : a1,a2,...,an,... ½  ?½0,1 .
That is, b( a1,a2,...,an,... ½  ) denotes P(n)’s belief about the
propensity ofplayers withattributes a1,a2,...,an,... ½  to cooperate.
We assume that P(n) initially believes that all players are cooper-
ators with probability one. This belief is updated after every
interaction as a function of the other player’s behavior: the belief is
simply the average of the actions of those individuals of a specific
group that P(n) has met. If, for example, P(1) has met three players
with ai
1~1, of which two have defected and one has cooperated,
then P(n)’s belief about individuals with ai
1~1 is that they defect
with probability 2/3, and hence b(1)~2=3. P(1) then cooperates
with the next individual exhibiting ai
1~1 with probability
1{b(1)~1=3, and updates its beliefs again as a function of what
that new opponent does. In a sense, then, all individuals with the
same first n traits are treated as if they were the same person (we
investigate later the consequences of potential misperceptions–e.g.,
seeing a blue person as red). More complex learning strategies (e.g.,
Bayesian updating) could easily be implemented, but our point here
is that even the most basic learning algorithm is sufficient for our
results.
At the beginning of the game, each player’s strategy Si is
defined as follows:
Si~
ALLD if ~ A Ai~ B B0[½0,a)
TFT if ~ A Ai~ B B0[½a,b)
Prejudiced if ~ A Ai~ B B0§b,
8
> <
> :
where a and b are simple parameters that affect the proportion of
each strategy in the population, and ~ B B~½b1,b2,...,bN  (bn[½0,1 
and
PN
n~1 bn~1) is a random vector of weights. Note that we
assume that ~ B B is a random vector, but that it is common to all
players. This assumption is crucial, because it implies that
strategies are, to some extent, determined by the players’
attributes. In other words, a correlation between attributes and
behavior is assumed to exist, although it is initially unknown to the
players. We investigate below the effect of loosening that
correlation by incorporating various types of ‘‘noise.’’
The game proceeds in T steps. In each of them, players are
randomly paired to play a prisoner’s dilemma with another player.
The payoffs are simply the ones used in Axelrod’s original
tournament [15]:
CD
C
D
35
01
 !
Figure 1. Illustration of the classifications made by a preju-
diced individual as a function of her level of prejudices. On the
left, we show the DNA sequence of five players, and on the right, the
way these players would be categorized by a prejudiced individual
according to its level of prejudice. A very prejudiced player, P(1), only
observes the first attribute, and hence forms coarse groups. P(4), on the
other hand, observes all four attributes and, since no two individuals
share the same DNA, treats each individual as unique.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g001
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and used as measure of its ‘‘fitness’’ or success. Note that, to keep
things simple and to ensure that no other mechanism is causing
our result, we assume that there is no imitation involved: players
follow one strategy and never deviate from it (however, we
investigate the role of noise below).
To sum up, we model an n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game in which players are randomly assigned a vector of
attributes. These attributes determine their strategy (TFT, ALLD
or prejudiced) according to a function unknown to the players, but
common to all of them. Prejudiced players observe one or more of
their partners’ attributes (P(1) observes the first one, P(3) the first
three, etc.), and draw inferences on the basis of their interactions.
These inferences then form the basis of the prejudiced player’s
probability to cooperate or defect with future partners.
Results
We find that the performance of various strategies depends
fundamentally on the shadow of the future [15]–the expected
number of interactions that a player has with a given individual
over the course of the entire game. More specifically, the shadow
of the future is defined as SF~
T
I
, where T is the duration of the
game and I is the total number of players. Note that SF refers to
an expected number of interactions, since partners are chosen
randomly in each time step. A long shadow of the future does not
guarantee that two players will meet several times over the course
of a game, but simply that there is a high probability that they will.
For most of our results, we consider a simulation in which each
player has a total of five attributes (we also study below the impact
of varying the total number of attributes). In line with [19], we find
that ALLD does best for a short shadow of the future (a low
duration combined with many players), because defection is then
clearly the dominant strategy (Fig. 2 A). TFT, on the other hand,
does not draw inferences, and hence exposes itself to exploitation
every time it encounters a new partner. This risk of exploitation
pays off in the long run because it allows TFT players to accurately
learn the other players’ strategies, but not if the shadow of the
future is short (Fig. 2 B). As an example, consider a situation with
N players and duration T~N. In such a situation, the shadow of
the future is 1, i.e., each player expects to meet every other
individual only once over the course of the game. Assume
moreover that all players follow the strategy ALLD. In such a
Figure 2. Performance of prejudiced and non-prejudiced strategies. Average score of different strategies as a function of the two
components of the ‘‘shadow of the future’’ SF (game duration|number of players). The five ‘‘heat’’ plots illustrate the average payoff of various
strategies in a population split equally between TFT and ALLD players (A and B). In simulations C–E, one single prejudiced player is added to each
simulation. Each individual is given five random binary traits, and prejudiced players extrapolate based on one (P(1)), three (P(3)) or all of these traits
(P(5)). TFT performs well when the shadow of the future is long (small population and long duration). In contrast, ALLD performs best for a short
shadow of the future. Prejudiced strategies perform best for intermediate shadows of the future. Each data point on the 100|300 grid is an average
over five hundred simulations, for a total of 15 million simulations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g002
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cooperate with–and be exploited by–every player. By the end of
the game, it would know precisely who is a defector (everyone)
with certainty, but this knowledge would be useless at this point,
since the short shadow of the future implies that it most likely will
never meet them again. This is what we mean when we say that
TFT learns precisely, but slowly.
On the contrary, a prejudiced player would perform quite
w e l li ns u c haw o r l d .I tw o u l ds t a r tb yc o o p e r a t i n gi ni t sf i r s tf e w
interactions, but quickly draw inferences about the rest of the
population, and hence avoid exploitation even against partners
it has not yet met. However, while extrapolation allows
prejudiced players to be fast at identifying patterns (e.g., ‘‘blue
people tend to defect’’) and, as a result, to avoid exploitation on
a large scale, it also implies a potentially high error rate: missed
opportunities to cooperate, or defection against cooperators. In
contrast, less prejudiced strategies (TFT being an extreme case)
reach a very accurate picture of each individual’s behavior, but
obtaining this picture is slow and hence subject to initial
exploitation.
This trade-off between expediency and precision is visible even
between different levels of prejudices. Thus, the strategy P(1),
which only observes one of the five attributes, learns very rapidly,
and hence does well when the shadow of the future is relatively
short (Fig. 2 C). However, because it misjudges its opponents too
frequently, it also has a high error rate, and therefore performs
poorly when the shadow of the future is long. P(3), a strategy in
which 3 of the 5 traits are observed, is an intermediate case
between P(1) and P(5): it is slower to learn than P(1), but also
makes fewer mistakes (see Fig. 2 D). Finally, P(5) observes all 5
attributes and is quite slow to learn–however, it is still much faster
than TFT because it extrapolates–and hence performs relatively
poorly when the shadow of the future is short, but well when it is
long (Fig. 2 E). Note in particular the similarity with TFT, for
which every player is treated as unique.
Comparing the relative performances of these different
strategies confirms this finding, and also demonstrates the
superiority of prejudiced strategies for intermediate values of the
shadow of the future (Fig. 3). In particular, both P(3) and P(5)
manage to outperform both ALLD and TFT for shadows of the
future between 2 and 6 (a range that includes a large portion of
real-world interactions).
We have shown that prejudiced strategies perform well against
both TFT and ALLD. But how do they perform against
themselves, i.e., against other prejudiced players? To answer this
question, we varied the proportion of the population that relies on
prejudiced strategies, and found that the more prejudiced players
are added to the simulation, the lower their performance becomes.
In other words, prejudiced players perform best in isolation (Fig. 4).
There are at least two reasons for this result. First, a large
proportion of prejudiced players imply a higher number of missed
opportunities. This is because prejudiced players rely on crude
approximations, and hence two of them interacting is likely to
multiply the probability with which at least one misestimates the
other. Second, and most important, prejudiced strategies are
inconstant because prejudiced players cooperate or defect based
on their (evolving) prejudices–not on their genetic encoding.
Prejudiced strategies strive among players whose strategies are
relatively stable over time, but are error-prone against inconstant
ones. As a result, inferences drawn about their strategy at time t
are unlikely to be correct at time tz1. Prejudiced players are good
at simplifying the world, but fail when the world is too complex.
In addition, we investigated the performance of these various
strategies in the presence of different types of noise [20]. We
Figure 3. Prejudiced strategies outperform TFT and ALLD for
intermediate shadows of the future. Average score of various
strategies as a function of the shadow of the future. TFT performs best
when the horizon is long. ALLD, on the other hand, performs best when
the horizon is short. For any intermediate shadow of the future,
prejudiced strategies (such as P(5)) obtain higher average scores than
either ALLD or TFT. The results are based on 100 simulations with 50%
TFT, 50% ALLD and one prejudiced player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g003
Figure 4. Strategies with the highest average score, as a
function of the proportion of prejudiced players. Each individual
is given five traits; the proportion of prejudiced (P(5)) players added to
the simulation is ‘‘% P(5)’’, with the remaining population equally split
between ALLD and TFT players. For short shadows of the future, ALLD
defeats all other strategies. For longer shadows of the future,
prejudiced players can beat TFT, but only if the total proportion of
prejudiced players in the population remains sufficiently low. In other
words, prejudiced strategies perform well against TFT and ALLD, but
not against themselves.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g004
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strategies, because it makes learning far more difficult. First, we
assumed that the mapping from traits to strategy can be imperfect,
in the sense that ‘‘DNA’’ might not determine behavior. More
specifically, we assumed that a proportion of players are assigned a
random strategy (ALLD or TFT), regardless of their traits. This
makes inferences from traits to strategies far more difficult. As
expected, we find that prejudiced strategies are particularly
sensitive to this type of noise (Fig. 5). Prejudiced strategies are
successful when the inferences drawn have at least some validity.
For example, prejudiced players are good at learning that blue
people tend to defect more frequently than yellow people. If,
however, there exists no connection whatsoever between color and
behavior, prejudiced players will nonetheless draw inferences–
wrong ones–and apply them with equal confidence, with
potentially disastrous results. As a result, higher levels of noise in
the mapping from traits to strategies significantly lower the fitness
of prejudiced strategies.
A second type of noise we investigated is the possibility that
players play in discordance with their strategy. They might do so
by mistake or strategically, but the result is that the strategy of
these players becomes more difficult to determine for observers.
More practically, we assume that in every time step of the game, a
player plays a random move (cooperate or defect) with some
probability, instead of the one she is programmed to play. For
example, a TFT player might defect when she is meant to
cooperate. Again, we find in this case that the larger the rate of
mistake, the less competitive prejudiced strategies become (Fig. 6).
Note that this type of noise also affects the efficiency of TFT for
the same reasons: noise leads to wrong inferences about an
individual’s strategy, and hence to an ill-suited response in the next
period [21]. A third type of noise involves perceptions. Suppose that
prejudiced players might misperceive the traits of their opponents.
For example, they might perceive them as rich when they are
really poor, or as blue when they are red. We implemented this
concept by assuming that, with some probability, a prejudiced
player will misperceive one of his opponent’s traits. For example, a
true DNA sequence ½0,0,1  might instead be recorded by the
prejudiced player as ½0,0,0 . Again, we find that the results are
damaging for prejudiced strategies, although not as much as for
the other types of noise analyzed above (Fig. 7).
Discussion
The outbreak of cooperation in a hostile environment such as
the prisoner’s dilemma has been the object of a large amount of
research in numerous fields ranging from social sciences
[15,22,23] to biology [24] and physics [25,26]. Probably the
most important finding in this literature is that TFT defeats most
other strategies in a wide range of environments [15,27].
However, we showed here that TFT suffers from one major
drawback, which limits its applicability in the real world: it is
relatively slow to learn [28]. Considering for example Axelrod’s
original setup, TFT players need to meet at least once with
another player before they form an ‘‘opinion’’of her. This
strategy is well-suited if the population is relatively small and
stable (no births or migration) because the initial risk of
exploitation pays off, given the large expected number of
interactions with the same players. However, when populations
renew themselves rapidly, as is the case (to varying degrees) in
bacterial, animal, or human populations, TFT can incur high
initial costs because it cooperates in the first round against
numerous defectors, yet without reaping the long-term benefits of
this learning process. In fact, these costs are very high if the
Figure 5. Strategies with the highest average score, as a
function of the level of noise. Noise refers to the probability that a
player’s strategy does not correspond to its DNA. In other words, it
weakens the correlation between specific traits and strategy. The higher
the level of noise, the more players’ strategies are defined indepen-
dently of their traits. Prejudiced strategies perform well for low levels of
noise and intermediate values of the shadow of the future. For high
levels of noise, however, inferences drawn by prejudiced strategies
become less and less reliable. The results are based on one hundred
simulations with 50% TFT, 50% ALLD and one prejudiced player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g005
Figure 6. Strategies with the highest average score, as a
function of the rate of mistake. The rate of mistake refers to the
probability that a player will play randomly instead of following its
strategy. The higher the mistake rate, the more the population plays
cooperate or defect at random. Prejudiced strategies perform well for
low levels of mistake and intermediate values of the shadow of the
future. When more randomness is added, however, inferences drawn by
prejudiced strategies become less and less reliable. The results are
based on one hundred simulations with 50% TFT, 50% ALLD and one
prejudiced player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g006
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particularly problematic when initial losses are difficult to make
up for, as is the case for example when the rich get richer [29].
In other words, the problem with TFT is that it does not draw
any inferences about the population. It treats every individual as
unique. We showed here that this is often inefficient, and that
strategies that extrapolate from a small number of attributes
(prejudiced strategies) often perform better than both TFT or
defect, because they allow for faster (though less accurate)
learning.
These findings have clear empirical implications, in that they
relate a population’s speed of renewal–a function of, among other,
a country’s size, its openness, migration, birth and death rate–to
the prevalence of prejudices in that population. One prediction in
particular would be that people in societies traditionally charac-
terized by low rates of migration (e.g., islands) would judge their
peers on the basis of subtler cues that those in societies with high
levels of migration. When the population evolves slowly, the
expected number of interactions with a given person (the shadow
of the future) is high, and hence investing in finer discrimination
procedures pays off in the long run.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: TC DH. Performed the
experiments: TC. Analyzed the data: TC. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: TC DH. Wrote the paper: TC DH.
References
1. Schelling T (1971) Dynamic models of segregation. The Journal of Mathemat-
ical Sociology 1: 143–186.
2. Greenwald A, Banaji M (1995) Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem,
and stereotypes. Psychological review 102: 4.
3. Kahneman D (2003) A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded
rationality. American psychologist 58: 697–720.
4. Gladwell M (2005) The power of thinking without thinking. New York: Little,
Brown and Cie.
5. Ambady N, Rosenthal R (1993) Half a Minute: Predicting Teacher Evaluations
from Thin Slices of Nonverbal Behavior and Physical Attractiveness. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 64: 431–431.
6. Ambady N, LaPlante D, Nguyen T, Rosenthal R, Chaumeton N, et al. (2002)
Surgeons’ Tone of Voice: A Clue to Malpractice History. Surgery 132: 5–9.
7. Quillian L (2006) New approaches to understanding racial prejudice and
discrimination. Sociology 32: 299.
8. Gigerenzer G, Goldstein D (1996) Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of
bounded rationality. Psychological review 103: 650.
9. Gigerenzer G, Todd P (1999) Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. USA:
Oxford University Press.
10. Lewicki P (1986) Nonconscious social information processing. New York, NY:
Academic Press.
11. Macy M (1991) Learning to cooperate: Stochastic and tacit collusion in social
exchange. The American Journal of Sociology 97: 808–843.
12. Myers D (2004) Intuition: Its powers and perils. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
13. Simon H (1956) Rational choice and the structure of the environment.
Psychological review 63: 129–138.
14. Simon H (1959) Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral
science. The American Economic Review 49: 253–283.
15. Axelrod R, Hamilton W (1981) The Evolution of Cooperation. Science 211:
1390.
16. Santos F, Santos M, Pacheco J (2008) Social diversity promotes the emergence of
cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454: 213–216.
17. Perc M, Szolnoki A (2008) Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys Rev E 77.
18. Case A, Paxson C (2006) Stature and status: Height, ability, and labor market
outcomes. Working Paper 12466, National Bureau of Economic Research.
19. Axelrod R (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Basic Brook, New York.
20. Helbing D, Yu W, Rauhut H (2011) Self-Organization and Emergence in Social
Systems: Modeling the Coevolution of Social Environments and Cooperative
Behavior. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 35: 177–208.
21. Bendor J, Kramer R, Stout S (1991) When in Doubt… Journal of conict
resolution 35: 691.
22. Glance N, Huberman B (1993) The outbreak of cooperation. The Journal of
mathematical sociology 17: 281–302.
23. Macy M, Willer R (2002) From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and
Agent-Based Modeling. Annual review of sociology. pp 143–167.
24. West S, Griffin A, Gardner A, Diggle S (2006) Social evolution theory for
microorganisms. Nature Reviews Microbiology 4: 597–607.
25. Szabo ´G ,T o ˝ke C (1998) Evolutionary prisoners dilemma game on a square
lattice. Physical Review E 58: 69.
26. Szabo G, Fath G (2007) Evolutionary games on graphs. Physics Reports 446:
97–216.
27. Axelrod R (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of
Competition and Col-laboration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
28. Macy M, Flache A (2002) Learning dynamics in social dilemmas. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 99: 7229.
29. Chadefaux T, Helbing D (2010) How Wealth Accumulation Can Promote
Cooperation. PloS one 5: 1560–1563.
Figure 7. Strategies with the highest average score, as a
function of the rate of misperception. The rate of misperception
refers to the probability that a prejudiced player will record its
opponent’s attributes with some mistake. For example, a true sequence
of traits ½1,1,1  might be recorded as ½1,0,1 .T h eh i g h e rt h e
misperception rate, the more often a prejudiced player will wrongly
record one of her opponent’s traits. Here, the rate of misperception
affects the range of shadow of the future for which prejudiced players
(here P(5)) perform better than any other strategies. The results are
based on one hundred simulations with 50% TFT, 50% ALLD and one
prejudiced player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030902.g007
The Rationality of Prejudices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30902